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Many land titling programs have produced lackluster results in terms of
achieving access to credit for the poor. This may reect insucient empha-
sis on local banking practices. Bankers commonly use sophisticated methods
other than collateral to ensure repayment. Some methods rely on ex-ante in-
formation ows and formal land titles can improve these ows by signaling to
the bank important characteristics about borrowers. Using a household survey
from Indonesia, we provide evidence that formal land titles do have a positive
and signicant eect on access to credit and at least part of this eect is best
interpreted as an improvement in ex-ante information ows. This result stands
in contrast to the prevailing notion that land titles only function as collateral.
Analysts who neglect local banking practices may misinterpret the observed ef-
fect of systematic land titling programs on credit access because these programs
tend to dampen the signaling value of formal land titles.
21 Introduction
What are the channels through which land titles could aect access to formal credit?
The standard argument posits that formalizing property rights equips landowners
with collateral, opening up access to previously unavailable credit markets. In this
paper, we present evidence that formal land titles could also have an ex-ante informa-
tional value by signaling credit-worthiness to the banker. Our evidence gives a richer
understanding of one of the main justications for large-scale land titling programs
sponsored by the World Bank and other aid organizations, better access to credit for
poor landowners. At the very least, the success of these programs depends on how
local banking practices translate formal land titles into collateral. Additionally, when
bankers use formal land titles in alternative ways, these programs may have unin-
tended consequences. In particular, a systematic land titling program would likely
eliminate the signaling value of possessing a formal land title.
In Indonesia, as in many developing countries, obtaining a formal title is a lengthy,
bureaucratic and costly process. Therefore, having a formal land title can provide
information about unobservable characteristics, such as an ability to interact within
formal rules, the degree of integration into formal markets, business-minded charac-
teristics or the condition of the asset.1 The bank may prefer to lend to formally
titled households not only because the title mitigates the bank's risk in the case of a
default, but also because the title provides ex-ante information about the likelihood
of compliance with the loan contract.2
To assess the informational role of land titles, we use the Micronance Access and
Services Survey (MASS) 2002, which was conducted by Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI)
to evaluate households' micronance activity and potential new markets. The survey
provides disaggregated data on household economic activities, assets and loans for
over 1400 households in 70 villages across 6 provinces. Since not all borrowers with a
land title use it as collateral, we can separately identify the eect on loan size of having
3a land title versus oering it as collateral. In fact, only 40% of those with a formal
land title and formal bank loan use the title as collateral.3 We nd evidence for our
explanation of formal land titles as information by considering rst-time borrowers.
When dealing with borrowers who have had past loans, banks have to some degree
already solved their adverse selection problem. Thus, if a formal land title has a
signaling role, it should be more important for borrowers without established credit
histories.
We provide further support for the ex-ante informational role by taking a closer
look at the banking practices used in the small-scale credit market of Indonesia. A
number of factors arise in Indonesia that undermine the possibility of a legal transfer
if the borrower defaults: weak legal infrastructure, political pressure, a thin land mar-
ket, and the cost of foreclosure given the size of the loans involved. In the micronance
world, well-known examples such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the institution
we focus on in this paper, BRI, demonstrate that liquidity has already been provided
to the poor by means other than formal collateral. Banks use alternative enforce-
ment mechanisms that rely on reputation, such as lending within social networks and
group monitoring, to solve both ex-ante adverse selection and ex-post moral hazard
problems.4 Using eld observations and a unique mail survey of BRI unit heads that
we conducted in 2004, we conrm that banks use other means to ensure repayment
for the relatively small loans we are considering. Moreover, bankers report that the
legal process to foreclose or collect on collateral is too costly for one-o relationships.
In fact, even the process of ocially registering the collateral may be prohibitively
costly.
If banks use alternative enforcement methods, then the information eect observed
through comparing rst-time borrowers and repeat borrowers may reect ex-post
or ex-ante informational constraints.5 We are able to distinguish between these
two interpretations by focusing on a subset of borrowers that possess xed income
4salaries (by far the most common form of securitization other than land titles). Our
evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that a formal land title plays an ex-post
informational role.
Of course, land titles can also aect credit demand, and one may be concerned
that observed dierences between rst-time and repeat borrowers reect the impact
of land titles on credit demand. We address this issue, rst, by using information
about demand from rejected loan applicants. Then, after correcting for selection,
we evaluate how large a role land title's eect on demand could play. Second, we
supplement the actual data with information about hypothetical demand and supply
constructed from the MASS survey. We nd that the main results can not be fully
explained by the demand story.
Thus, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that land titles
do matter for credit access. Second, we establish an additional important role that
formal land titles play in the credit market. Namely, formal land titles reveal dicult
to observe applicant characteristics to a resourceful banker. Even when alternative
enforcement mechanisms are favored over those that use formal collateral, land titles
can still support and develop the credit market by improving the ow of information
before the loan contract is signed. Our contributions suggest that incorporating
banking practices into the analysis is necessary to understand the eect of land titles
on access to credit.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following manner. In section 2, we briey
discuss the previous literature on how land titles aect access to credit. In section 3,
we outline some important features of the legal and credit settings in Indonesia and
discuss our mail survey of BRI Unit bankers. This section motivates our approach to
the question of how land titles aect access to credit. Section 4 describes the data
we use for the regression analysis, the MASS survey supplemented with village-level
census data. Section 5 presents our empirical strategy and main results, including
5subsection 5.4, in which we explore whether unobservable credit demand can explain
our results using both actual and hypothetical data. Finally, section 6, more generally,
addresses the issue of endogeneity of land title using instrumental variables, and then
section 7 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
The positive eect of formal land titles on access to credit is purported to be well-
established by Deininger and Binswanger [1999]. Nevertheless, in our survey of the
literature, we observe mixed results. Table 1 lists previous empirical work on how
land titles aect incidences of formal bank credit. The rst three columns correspond
to the study, the area of study and the empirical results as to whether land title
had an impact on credit access. In addition, some studies consider systematic titling
programs where possessing a land title can be viewed as relatively exogenous to the
credit decision, while others study \sporadic" (or individually obtained) titles, which
require more eort for households (shown in the fourth column). The latter is the
case we are studying in Indonesia. The results reported vary considerably, reecting
that these studies took place in dierent countries with dierent sets of institutions
governing the credit and land markets, and, in particular, dierences in banking
practices.
Table 1 here
The empirical problem of measuring the eect of possession of a land title on the
probability of obtaining a formal bank loan requires separating the eects of land
title on the supply of formal credit from the eects on the demand for credit. Most
studies simply assume that there exists excess demand for formal credit.6 Feder
et al. [1988] lets observed credit equal the minimum of supplied credit and credit
demanded but then resorts to assuming excess demand in the empirical work. Using
6the MASS survey, Johnston and Morduch [2008] presents evidence that excess demand
is not an appropriate assumption in our context. We address this problem by using
information about the demand of those who have had rejected loan applications and
measures of hypothetical demand and supply. We try to evaluate whether demand
could explain the observed eect of land title. Field and Torero [2004] addresses the
problem by using detailed information on dierent banks' requirements for loans and
takes advantage of the timing of the implementation of the titling program. Using
matching on observables to dierence out demand, they measure the eect of land
title on credit access only among banks that require title. We can not employ this
method because we do not have access to a titling program in our context.
A second problem is the potential endogeneity of land title, which has not been
adequately addressed in the previous literature. The problem has either been ignored
or a systematic titling program has been used. In the rst instance, the empirical
estimates are likely to be biased. In the second instance, the results miss any di-
rect eect of title as information. Although one could argue that titling programs
often fail to produce full compliance, giving scope for an information eect, there are
two reasons why this approach is unsatisfactory. First, the signal is likely to be much
noisier (due to the time and cost subsidies of the program implementers). Hence, sep-
arating the information and collateral eect is more problematic than in the sporadic
setting. Second, faced with imperfect compliance, the econometrician only identies
the average treatment eect of title under strong assumptions. One could accurately
measure the eect of land title on access to credit by using an instrumental variable.
However, the use of instrumental variables puts the randomized systematic program
on equal footing as the sporadic setting where, in principle, the signal is less noisy. In
general, using instrumental variables to construct unbiased estimates in order to test
a signaling hypothesis is problematic. The signal is correlated with unobservables.
We address this issue by using village-level instrumental variables.
7Not all development experts consider titling programs to be appropriate in all
situations. Customary land rights may be dicult to describe or put into an ad-
equate formal title. Atwood [1990], in his study of sub-Saharan countries, argues
that land titling can create uncertainty that undermines local relationships. In ar-
eas where customary land rights are strong and land markets are not really relevant,
titling systems do little to benet the community and may disrupt subtle societal
interactions. Only in areas where rights are not well-established by the community
and land markets do matter, can titling systems possibly have a benecial role (Ho
et al. [1993]). Lanjouw and Levy [2002] shows how community relationships in an
urban area can function as formal claims on assets. Hence, what we might measure
is land title as a substitute for social networks. In this case, our results only hold in
a local sense: rst-time borrowers may simply have worse social networks. Although
land title improves access to credit for this group, this may not hold for those with
better social networks. Nevertheless, even if tenure security can be achieved through
informal means, it is not a given that large amounts of formal credit can be accessed
on the basis of this same community relationship.
3 Institutional Background
3.1 Credit Market Setting and Banking Practices
In Indonesia, there is a wide range of nancial services including both private and
government banks in the formal sector as well as ROSCA's, neighborhood cooper-
atives and money lenders in the informal sector. After the 1997 nancial crisis in
Indonesia, there has been much attention on creating a stable nancial environment.
Indonesia has an extensive rural banking system, mostly supplied by BRI, the bank
most central to our study. BRI is the fourth largest bank in Indonesia with 10% of
market share as measured by the total assets held by banks. The BRI Unit is the part
8of the bank that deals with smaller sized loans.7 It has over 4000 oces, reaching
roughly a third of all households in Indonesia.8
In general, BRI units attempt to reach a part of the population that might not have
had the opportunity to participate in the formal nancial sector. The emphasis of
the BRI Unit is small-scale in order to develop a personal relationship with the client.
The BRI approach allows discretion within a set of basic rules. For example, although
a loan above 20 million Rp. (approximately $2300 in 2004) must be approved by a
central BRI branch, there is no one formula for accepting or rejecting loan applicants.
Unit managers are allowed to rely on notions such as \trustworthiness" when granting
a loan.9 Unit managers are also encouraged to make use of progressive lending,
interest refunds for timely repayment and social networks to raise the repayment
rates. Successful unit managers are rewarded with more discretion and higher limits
for lending without branch approval.
We conducted a mail survey of 192 BRI units across the same 6 provinces and 12
districts where the MASS household survey was conducted. Our response rate was
over 60%. Most of the surveys were answered directly by the unit manager. The rst
point to emphasize again is that BRI units do accept forms of land documents as
collateral that are not formal land titles. In our mail sample, on average only 42%
of loans that are collateralized are done so with a land title certicate. However,
almost 40% of all loans are not collateralized at all, instead they are guaranteed by
deductions from future salary (xed income). This is similar to what was found in
the MASS survey where 33% of the 326 loans recorded at BRI units or branches were
collateralized by a formal land title.
More revealing is the fact that when asked to assess the most important factor in
considering whether to grant a loan, 82% indicated the character of the individual.
Moreover, when determining the repayment ability of the applicant (which determines
the loan size for which the applicant is eligible), the most important factor was cash-
9ow (66%) followed by character (20%). Only respondent indicated that collateral was
the most important factor for determining repayment capacity, and none indicated
collateral as the most important factor in considering whether to grant a loan. This
suggests that unit managers are aware of the informational problem and they make
use of personal characteristics (including the past relationship with the bank) in the
loan decision as opposed to solely relying on collateral to align incentives ex-post.
Repayment rates are very high in the BRI units, above 95% in most areas (John-
ston et al. [2001]). As a policy, BRI prefers to avoid using foreclosure to enforce
repayment. Foreclosure is described as a very rare event anecdotally but our survey
indicates that it does happen; 37% of unit managers report having foreclosed on a
client at least once.10 Since the legal cost of foreclosure is high, we would instead
expect to see forced or encouraged sales of pledged assets. In our survey, 77% do
indicate encouraging clients to sell collateral in order to repay the loan at some point
in the past year. The existence of encouraged sale of clients' assets may indicate that
the asset is not fully transferable to the bank. BRI and other banks in Indonesia
accept as collateral informal land documents that demonstrate ownership but are not
legally transferable. Moreover, for individual BRI units, the cost of registering the
title as collateral may outweigh its possible benets. Formally collecting on collateral
loses value when clients will themselves nd a way to liquify at least part of the as-
set in order to maintain good relations with the bank. This suggests again that the
courts are being bypassed even though the banks make use of collateral. However,
the bank's reliance on a personal relationship with the client is what makes borrowing
for new clients that much more dicult.
For instance, when asked how new clients nd out about BRI and its services, 88%
of the bankers said it was through friends and family. We also inquired about the
maximum loan size available to clients without a formal land document. We nd, on
average, old clients would be eligible for 5 mil Rp more than new clients, a dierence
10which is the average value of a loan at BRI units. New clients without formal land
documents face tighter credit constraints due to the practice of progressive lending
and are less likely to take advantage of BRI's services unless they already know others
who do so.
Our survey also asked if having a land title would increase the likelihood of success
for a loan application. The answer is in the armative for 60% of our sample though
only 29% say that having a formal land title will increase the likelihood of receiving
a higher loan amount than someone without a land title.11
The results from our survey are consistent with the idea that having a formal
land title signals useful information to the bank, especially if the titled household
is a new borrower. Banks can (and do) use methods other than formal collateral to
solve the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The emphasis on the personal
relationship between bank and client leads to the fact that these alternative methods
may make it more dicult for rst time borrowers. The use of land title as a signal
goes some distance to alleviating this unfortunate outcome.
Having discussed the novel data set that we collected of BRI unit managers'
banking practices, one might expect us to use this data in the regression analysis.
We do not because unit managers move around quite frequently, so there is no way
to match revealed banking practices to geographical locations. Instead, we use this
data to motivate the interpretation of the empirical results.
3.2 Land Law in Indonesia
The National Land Administration Agency (BPN) grants titles to non-forest land.12
Out of the 80 million land parcels on the scal tax register less than 27 million
are on the legally titled register. In 2004, about 1.3 million new titles were registered
sporadically and the total number of land parcels was estimated to be growing by more
than 1 million per year.13 The process of getting a title is both lengthy and costly.
11The usual process requires a letter from the village head verifying that the land is in
one's possession. The applicant then needs to have a survey conducted which requires
funding the boundary markers, the survey fee, and covering all transportation costs.
After this is completed, the document must be veried, mapped and nally certied.
In total, the process can easily take one year. Once the certicate is obtained, a tax
must be paid on the right to have a title on a piece of land (this is a one time tax; this
is not a property tax or tax on the sale). Anecdotal evidence reveals there are also
signicant informal costs accumulated throughout the titling process. For example,
the stated fee of a land certicate is around 300,000 Rp. (approximately $35 in 2004).
However, when we asked what the actual fee was, respondents' answers ranged from
1 to 2 million Rp. (approximately $116-$232 in 2004).14
4 Data Description
For the regression analysis in this paper, we utilize data from two dierent sources.
Our main source is the BRI MASS 2002 household survey. We use this data in all
results. We also have additional village level information from a survey of village
heads conducted annually by the Indonesian government, PODES 2003.15 In the
rest of this section, we will briey describe each data set and give some summary
statistics.
4.1 MASS Data
This survey consists of over 1400 households spread across 74 dierent villages, both
rural and urban, in the provinces of West Java, East Java, West Kalimantan, East
Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua.16 It slightly over-samples poor households espe-
cially in rural areas (Johnston and Morduch [2008]).
Table 2 here
12Table 2 gives the percentage of titled households in each province. We exclude the
landless in this table and in all results we present. For households with multiple land
parcels, we label them as titled if any of their land is titled.17 The vast majority of
our sample had over 80% of their total land value either titled or documented in some
way and only 53 households report no documentation at all. Other land documents
refer to land deeds, customary or traditional land documents, and tax receipts as
discussed earlier. In general, titled households are less common in rural areas (29%)
than urban areas (65%).
Table 3 here
Table 3 gives the summary statistics for the covariates that we will be including
in our estimations and other descriptive statistics. FormalBank equals one if the
household reports ever having a formal loan. The per capita household income is
divided by the poverty line in that province, with dierent cutos for rural and urban
areas, in order to make more meaningful interpretations across very dierent areas.
Table 4 here
We have data on 645 distinct loans from about 575 dierent households. On
average, formal bank loans are signicantly larger than loans from other sources and
the majority (74%) of reported loans are formal.18 Of the formal loans reported,
123 went to households for whom this was their rst loan. The most common formal
loan use reported was working capital for an existing venture (37%) followed by
home improvement (24%). We can classify 44% of the formal loans as being used
for production purposes and the remaining 56% as being for consumption or other.
Among the rst time borrowers, the distribution is practically the same, 43% for
production and 57% for consumption.19
In both rural and urban areas, more titled households do have formal loans (40%
of titled households have had a formal bank loan compared to only 20% of other
documented households), and loans securitized by formal land titles tend to be larger
13on average.
Because our loan amounts are from all dierent years, with the majority of loans
granted in 1998-2002 (only 9% of the formal loans are from the earlier 1990's), we
normalized the loan amounts by converting to CPI-adjusted U.S. dollars. Table 4
breaks down the formal loan amounts by the type of security oered. First-time bor-
rowers use the same types of securities and oer them in roughly the same proportion
as the general population of borrowers.
Table 5 here
Table 5 describes in more detail the characteristics of the subset of our sample
that we are particularly interested in. Panel A gives the most important personal and
village-level characteristics for all households that have had a formal loan. Panel B
looks at the same characteristics for households that are rst-time borrowers. There
are no signicant dierences between rst-time borrowers and borrowers that have
had past loans in any of these observable characteristics.20 Therefore, any dierence
between the bank's relationship with a rst-time borrower and its relationship with
a repeated borrower cannot be attributed to dierences that are observable to the
econometrician.
The BRI MASS survey was conducted by BRI loan ocers who work in dierent
geographical areas than those surveyed. After they conducted each survey, the enu-
merators were asked to privately judge the household's feasibility as a loan candidate.
They reported whether they would grant the household a loan and what the maximum
loan size would be and under what terms. These questions give us a measure of hypo-
thetical supply. That is, without considering the eects of title on credit demand, we
can evaluate whether a formal land title systematically aects the amount of credit
for which a household is hypothetically eligible. That these questions were answered
by actual BRI loan ocers adds to their validity as a measure of credit supply. In
general, the maximal feasible loan amounts were comparable to actual loan amounts,
14but many households that have never had a formal loan were judged feasible. The
average feasible loan amount was almost 8 million Rp. or roughly CPI-adjusted US
$454.
The MASS survey also asked households how much credit they would hypothet-
ically be interested in obtaining if they had not applied for a formal bank loan. Of
the 901 households that were judged feasible, 565 had never had a formal bank loan.
Over half of those with no previous bank loan claimed that they have never applied
because they did not want to be in debt. They were then asked a series of hypo-
thetical questions about their possible desired loan amounts and conditions. From
these questions, we can construct a measure of hypothetical demand. However, this
measure of demand is somewhat problematic because even after giving a hypothetical
loan amount, over 80% still insisted that they had no intention of borrowing formally.
Their number one reason, given by 44%, was that they were concerned about repay-
ment. Those that were titled were equally likely to be worried about repayment as
others.
4.2 PODES 2003
Panel B of Table 3 gives the summary statistics for village level covariates from the
PODES data set that we include in our estimations. These statistics are calculated
using only the villages in the BRI MASS sample. Overall they are roughly comparable
to the full Indonesian census of village heads. We have slightly more villages with
registered councils (66% in our sample as opposed to 58% overall). RicePaddy =
1 if rice paddies are the village's primary form of income. Due to the fact that our
sample is split roughly equally between urban and rural, we have less villages with rice
paddies as their main source of income than the Indonesian average of 63%. Forest
= 1, if the village lives near a forested area.
155 Empirical Strategy and Results
We will rst consider a straightforward test that looks at how possessing a formal
land title aects credit access while controlling for other observables that might also
inuence credit access.
yi = Xi + titlei + i (1)
where yi, the outcome of interest, is either an indicator variable of whether household
i has ever had a formal bank loan or the total amount of formal bank loans which
have been extended to household i in the recent past. Xi consists of both household
and village-level covariates. When the outcome of interest is an actual outcome,
not a hypothetical one, we cluster standard errors at the subdistrict level because
the BRI Unit lending area is roughly a subdistrict and the BRI framework permits
considerable discretion to unit managers.21
We have to make a further assumption on the error structure when the outcome
of interest is binary and we use a Probit model. Letting y be the latent variable, the
unobserved value to the bank of giving a loan to household i, we have:
y
 = X + title +  where   N(0;1) (2)
y = I[y
 > 0]
P(y = 1jX) = (X + title)
If one equates credit access with the supply of credit, then equation 1 assumes for
each household the supply constraint is binding. Alternatively, access may also refer
to supply or demand of credit in which case no further assumptions are necessary.
However, policy analysis is problematic since we do not separately determine the eect
of title on supply and demand. To this end, in subsection 5.4, we explore hypothetical
16supply which we observe for all households surveyed, hypothetical demand which we
observe for all households that do not have a loan, and the demanded amounts of
loans for rejected loan applicants.
Next, we estimate OLS of loan amounts to compare the dierences between oer-
ing a land title as security and simply possessing a land title. This step sets up the
empirical test of interest to see if there is an information eect of land title. We check
whether these dierences vary for rst time borrowers as our main empirical test of
the signaling hypothesis mentioned in the introduction. We then look at whether or
not the land title improves contracting under private information through ex-ante or
ex-post information ows. The results of subsection 5.4 will also inform whether or
not demand is driving the dierence between rst-time borrowers and repeat borrow-
ers. We deal with unobservable demand directly since it is the most likely candidate to
confound the results. Lastly, we address the endogeneity of land title more generally
in section 6.
5.1 Formal Credit Usage
After controlling for household and village-level characteristics, we nd a positive
correlation between having had a formal bank loan and possessing a land title (see
column (3) in table 6 for our full probit specication). Since estimation of the probit
model may be sensitive to the specication, table 6 also shows specications including
just income and assets (column 1), income, assets and household characteristics (col-
umn 2), and income, assets, household and village characteristics (column 3) which
we will refer to as the full specication.22 Using the probit model we nd that, at
the median, becoming titled increases your probability of having a formal loan by
4.8% (with a robust standard error of 3.6%) to 7.3% (with robust standard error of
4.3%).
Since other land documents are also used as collateral, the fact that having a land
17title has an eect on the probability of a household having formal credit suggests
to us that either land titles could be functioning as a signal of credit-worthiness or
they are a better source of collateral from either the borrower's or bank's perspective.
However, conditional on having a formal loan, titled households and other documented
households are equally likely to oer some type of land document as collateral (about
40% of the time).23 Since all documented households are equally likely to oer some
land document, we infer the relative benet of oering a land document to other
forms of security is similar. That is to say, if the only eect of a formal land title
is as a better source of collateral, we would expect titled households to use the title
comparatively more often.
In order to better understand these results, we incorporate local banking practices
into the analysis and derive a direct test of the signaling hypothesis. First, we allow
banks to treat rst-time borrowers dierently than repeat borrowers (discussed in next
subsection). Second, we explore more sophisticated bankers who condition the signal
of possessing a formal land title on the likelihood of possessing one in a particular
village (discussed in section 6).
5.2 Loan Size - Having title vs oering it?
The key question and the main contribution of the paper is to evaluate whether having
a formal title inuences the size of observed formal loans, and, if so, to determine
whether this is purely an eect of formal land title being better collateral. The results
presented in table 7 compare least squares estimates under various specications.
Using the full set of controls, the specications include dummy variables that indicate
possession of a land title (column (1)), oering a land title as collateral (column (2)),
and both possessing a land title and oering land title as collateral (column (3)).
Each column contains the full specication including clustering at the sub-district
level. We nd that both having a land title and oering land title as security increase
18the loan size on average, by 22% and 30% respectively. However, when both are
included in the full regression, only oering land title as security is signicant. This
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that collateral does matter for the credit
market in Indonesia and formal land titles serve this function well.
We repeat the specication in column (3) for both repeat and rst-time borrowers
separately (column (4)). Column (4) is the crucial test for the information story.
As discussed earlier, if formal land title functions as a signal it would be especially
important for rst-time borrowers. Only possessing a formal land title not oering the
title as security obtains signicance above the 95% level for rst-time borrowers. Since
the information problem is most apparent for rst-time borrowers, our interpretation
is that the bank is using the formal land title as a signal of important unobservables.
5.3 Ex-ante or Ex-post Informational Constraints?
As we discussed in the introduction, if formal land titles signal unobservable charac-
teristics to the bank, this improves ex-ante information ows. Our empirical evidence
is consistent with a formal land title signaling important information to the bank.
However, this evidence is also consistent with an alternative ex-post information story
that views formal land titles as supporting reputation-based contracting by making
information about default more public.24 Either mechanism predicts that rst-time
borrowers would experience a weaker eect of using land title as security than re-
peat borrowers would (rst-time borrowers have less reputational capital).25 In this
section, we investigate which information story is better supported by the data.
We start by looking at the eect of oering dierent types of security. We note
that, among formal banks, almost all loans have some security.26 Recall that ta-
ble 4 shows that the average loan size of those securitized by formal land titles is
signicantly larger than those securitized by other land documents.
If households have multiple kinds of security that they can oer, then we can test
19whether formal land titles improve reputation-based contracting. We consider the
subpopulation that has both a salary (since salary is often used to secure a loan) and
land documents. The increased eciency of reputation-based contracting should carry
over to the characteristics of the loan. To see this, we employ a simple test. First, we
compare whether there is a statistical dierence in the means of loan characteristics by
security oered for households with formal land titles. Next, we repeat this exercise
for those with other land documents. By comparing those households who have
salaries and formal titles with those with salaries and other land documents, we can
understand the relative value of the reputation-based contracting for formal titles,
while holding constant the benet of having a xed-income.
Of the 182 loans by households who have both a formal title and a salary, 33 of
these loans were securitized by something other than the land title or the salary. Of
the remaining 149 loans, 119 (79.9%) were secured with a salary and 30 (20.1%) have
a formal land title as collateral. Remarkably, for those households without a formal
land title, we see almost identical propensities to securitize the loan with the salary.
Among the 119 loans by households that did not have a formal land title but had a
salary, 29 loans were secured by something other than informal land documents or
salary. Of the remaining 90 loans, 73 (81.1%) oered their salary as security and 17
(18.9%) oered their informal land documents as collateral.
In table 8, we present loan and borrower characteristics according to the type of
collateral oered for both all observations and for a restricted sample that excludes
those observations with missing information as well as some outliers (loan observations
that claim the total payback amount is more than ten times the size of the original
loan).27 There is missing information for loan amounts, whether the loan is current
and/or the total amount paid by the borrower.
Table 8 here
For titled households, we see that those who oer salary appear to be \better"
20borrowers than those who oer title as security. They receive larger formal loans,
have more assets, have more years of schooling, are more likely to be judged feasible
are more likely to be current and have lower ratios of total payback to loan size.
However, only years of schooling is signicantly greater at the 5% level (see table
8, dierences in bold are signicant at the 5% level or greater). When we use the
restricted sample, the borrowers look more similar although years of schooling is still
signicantly greater for those households who oer salary as security. According
to the idea that formal titles improve reputation-based contracting, these borrowers
should be worse. This does not mean that there is no value to formal titles in terms
of improving reputation-based contracting because securing the loan with salary also
may improve reputational enforcement.
In order to control for the value of oering salary as security, we also look at house-
holds with informal land documents. Essentially, the same pattern emerges. Taken
together, this evidence does not support the idea that titling improves reputation-
based collateral because the improved public disclosure of default should lead to better
borrowers for those that choose to oer land title as security.
The systematic dierence in years of schooling between those that choose xed
income contracts and those that use land titles as security does have an ex-ante in-
formation interpretation. Dierent contracts have dierent costs for a household.
If households choose dierent contracts depending on their insurance premium and
transaction costs, then, following Spier [1992], one can easily show that in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information households may choose loan contracts to signal type
(in terms of ability to repay). Here, ability to repay may be positively correlated
with years of schooling. Oering a land title represents a contingent contract in the
Spier model. If the household is unable to repay, the bank will have to attempt to
collect the security. Oering salary would correspond to a non-contingent contract.
A risk-averse household can signal a superior ability to repay the loan by choosing
21the non-contingent contract since this contract provides less insurance, making it par-
ticularly costly for those with an inferior ability to repay. Using this classication
among households that both have outside employment and formal land title, we see
separation among the types in the direction that the model would predict. Moreover,
this holds no matter if we look at titled or other land documents, suggesting that the
collateral value of formal land title is not too dierent than the collateral value of
other land documents.
The alternative explanation is that the household chooses either salary or land
documents according to which one is a superior form of collateral. To explore this
hypothesis, we rank a household's salary and land assets by which decile each belongs.
Then, we construct an indicator that tracks whenever salary is in the comparatively
higher decile. We use this variable to predict choosing to oer salary as collateral.
Table 9 shows the results. We see that this variable is strongly associated with oering
salary as collateral.
This result could be driven by the fact that salaries and land values may be cor-
related. When we get the relative ranking by using predicted values from regressing
both salary and land values on our controls and subdistrict dummies, the relation-
ship between superior collateral and actual choice of collateral disappears. This is
evidence that the optimal choice of collateral appears to involve more than just which
collateral is worth more. It is then plausible that households take into consideration
the signaling model above. Moreover, this is further evidence against the hypothesis
that formal land titles are superior collateral. If formal land titles are more likely to
be oered as collateral holding their relative value xed, we might expect a negative
relationship between the indicator and choice of collateral.
225.4 Assessing the Role of Credit Demand
Economists contend that possessing stronger protection of property rights increases
investment incentives. The eects described in the previous subsections 5.1 and 5.2
could be at least partially due to households with land title demanding more nancing,
rather than shifts in credit supply due to households revealing unobservables. We
attempt to address this issue in this subsection, although given our data limitations
we can not rule out this possibility.
In order to give priority to actual outcomes data, we initially explore the relation-
ship between land titles and credit demand without reference to hypothetical demand
or supply. First, we look at the relationship between land titling and loan use. Here,
the idea is that land titling should only aect particular investments, i.e. household
or land specic investments (depending on what land is titled). We then discuss the
rejected loan applicants and the reconstruction of credit demand.
Relaxing the assumption that households are supply constrained, we observe the
following for all loan applicants:
yi = min(demandi;supplyi) (3)
For those who applied but were rejected, instead of observing yi, we know the
amount demanded directly, and, if a loan had been agreed to, the minimum in the
above equation would likely be the amount supplied. Moreover, for those rejected,
we know that the eect of title on the amount demanded is purely the demand eect
since no supply eect can be present. Therefore we can construct the following and
estimate the demand response for rejected households:
demandi = X
HH
i  + Dtitlei + ui (4)
We can then try to understand if the demand eect could explain our results.28
23Table 10 here
The problem is that u and  (from equation 1) may be correlated. Table 10 shows
the distribution of the control variables for rejected applicants. Rejected households
tend to have less income, assets and education. Therefore, we employ a selection
equation (not shown) yielding a probability of rejection. We use distance to the
nearest bank to inuence the probability of rejection since alternative enforcement
methods become more dicult the farther away a household is. Distance should not
aect loan amounts, given that the closest bank is likely within the subdistrict.
Another problem is possible unobservable confounding supply variables. To cor-
rect for this, we include as a regressor a variable that tracks the mismatch between
supply and demand. Specically, we condition predicted demand on the feasible
amount that a loan ocer would lend a household as described in 5.
demandi = X
HH
i  + Dtitlei +  resid
feasible
i + ui (5)






We reestimate 5 to account for selection using distance as an excludable variable
that inuences the probability of rejection (again, not shown).
Finally, given that we have the feasible loan amounts judged by loan ocers as
well as hypothetical demand of those who did not apply for a loan, we can look at
the relationship between formal land titles and hypothetical supply and demand.
5.4.1 Demand and Loan Use
The standard argument is that land titling increases incentives to invest (and, hence,
credit demand) either by improving relative returns to the titled asset-specic invest-
ments or, in general, by decreasing the interest rate. In the former case, increased
credit demand due to titling should lead to greater borrowing for home improvement
(for titles on household plots) or consumptions loans (for investments in human cap-
24ital of the household) or for production loans (for titles on farming plots). When we
disaggregate the formal loans into loan type, we see that being titled has the strongest
eect for working capital loan amounts, not for home improvement or consumption
loans. We see that all these loans experience a weaker eect than loans for working
capital, capital for a pre-existing venture. While this is consistent with the desire of
households to increase investment in current ventures, possibly tied to the household,
the majority of the eect on working capital loan amounts is driven by using land
title as collateral. Thus, demand is unlikely driving the results because we nd little
evidence for land titles simply increasing credit demand.
Table 11 here
We should stress that the results on working capital loans show that land title as
collateral does indeed matter. Given sample size limitations, we can not accurately
verify whether the signaling eect of title is driven by repeat borrowers more likely to
have ventures that require working capital. However, taken in conjunction with the
evidence that is consistent with ex-ante information from section 5.3, these results
on working capital loans should suggest that land title may not matter as a demand
shifter.
5.4.2 Demand and Rejected Loan Applicants
Although demand (and supply) is, in general, not directly observed, we argue that
we do observe the actual credit demand of the rejected loan applicants in the MASS
survey (76 people reported recently having a rejected loan application). First, we
point out that being titled shows no relationship to applying for a loan nor the
requested loan amounts of those rejected. If having a land title inuenced demand,
one might expect for possessing a land title to be positively correlated with applying
for a loan and with the requested loan amounts of those borrowers who were obviously
supply constrained. We do not observe either relationship.
25Second, if our selection equation satises the necessary exclusion restriction, we
can derive credit demand for all borrowers from the subgroup of rejected applicants
and then reestimate the eect of title on the demand of credit to see if it can explain
the previous set of results. Table 12 shows that after controlling for selection and the
mismatch between supply and demand (column (3)), the eect of possessing a title
is not statistically signicant and the estimated eect is smaller than the estimated
eect of title on actual loan amounts. These results suggest that demand is not fully
driving the observed relationship between land title and loan amounts.
Table 12 here
5.4.3 Hypothetical Demand and Supply
In column (1) of table 13, we run the same specication as we used for the probability
of having a formal bank loan for whether a household was judged feasible. Having
a title does have a positive eect on the probability of being judged feasible though
not statistically signicant at the 10% level. The eect on feasible loan amount is not
precisely measured (possibly due to the fact that the variation in maximum feasible
loan amount is smaller than the variance of actual loan amounts given).
The fact that the loan ocers interview the household extensively at home sug-
gests that the loan ocers may have better observability than if the potential borrower
comes to the bank. If the household doesn't have a land title then the loan ocer can
assess other potential sources of security more easily. Therefore, this informational
advantage may make the estimates of the eect of land title weaker. This informa-
tional advantage also makes this regression suspect (since a disadvantage applies to
the econometrician). We nd that after instrumenting, shown in column (2), pos-
session of a title increases the probability at the median of being judged feasible by
47%.Thus, we interpret this to mean that either loan ocers recognize the value of
land title as potential collateral or land title does not perfectly measure the relevant
26unobservable borrower characteristics. in the latter case, the loan ocer can observe
and, subsequently, update the signal of possessing a formal land title.29 .
Table 13 here
In columns (3) and (4) of table 13 we switch the dependent variable to be hypo-
thetical demand. Again, we keep the same basic specication as in equation 1 but add
as a control whether or not the household was judged feasible and an interaction term
with this dummy variable and whether or not the household possesses a land title.
The results show that possessing a title has no eect on the desired loan amount,
neither for those judged feasible nor for those judged infeasible. If demand is driving
the results, we would expect land title to have an eect on desired loan amounts. If
households can correctly predict that they are feasible, then we would also expect an
additional aect for those who were judged feasible. Yet, we see none of these eects.
6 Instrumenting for Title
In this section, we address the endogeneity of land title. Given the nature of our data
set, this paper is necessarily more a description of economic interactions. The issue
of causality likely remains but instrumental variables can still improve the empirical
evidence for or against the signaling hypothesis. An additional word of caution is
in order. While we want to address the endogeneity of the land title variable, we
also want to capture the signaling eect. The diculty is that land title is correlated
with unobservable variables that aect credit access and some of these, in particular,
personal characteristics of the borrower desirable to the bank, we would like to include
in the eect of land title. However, by assumption, the typical instrumental variable
estimates asymptotically reduce the \bias" resulting from the correlation between
land title and any unobservable correlated with credit access to zero, removing any
27signaling eect. Thus, our instrumental variables technique should allow for the eect
of land title to capture its signaling role.
If a formal land title signals unobservable information about the borrower, we
want to allow the coecient on the titled variable to capture this eect, regardless of
whether or not land titles have a collateral eect. This rules out using an individual
level variable since an exogenous predictor of individual possession of a formal land
title would put too little weight on those who should not have a title but do and
those who should have a title but don't, the groups who stand most to benet from
the signaling mechanism. Moreover, using an exogenous predictor of average village
possession of a formal land title can better isolate the signaling value and correct for
any confounding village level variables, not captured by clustering at the subdistrict
level. Importantly, we rely on the fact that we have ruled out idiosyncratic demand in
the previous section so the main objection to exogeneity is not likely at the individual
level.30
To estimate the probability of a household having had a formal bank loan, we
use a bivariate probit model where we estimate the probability of a household being
titled (including our instruments) and allow the error terms in the two equations
to be correlated. For loan sizes, we will instrument for having a formal land title
and estimate using 2SLS. We argue that whether the village is located near forested
areas and whether or not rice paddies are the village's primary source of income are
valid instruments. Our strategy is then to use use village level instruments for the
individual level variable land title. Then, run a separate regression of our outcome
variable on the residuals of the rst stage.
Whether or not the village is located near forest land should be negatively cor-
related with the extent of titling. Forest land is not under the jurisdiction of the
BPN and hence land titles can not be issued for any plots on cleared forest that
have not yet been unmarked as forest. 28% of households are titled in villages near
28forested areas while 53% are titled in non-forested areas. Whether rice paddies are a
village's primary source of income also provides a measure of how likely a household
is to be titled. Rice paddies demand irrigation which is a labor-intensive activity that
can establish ownership in the eyes of the community. Considering the high cost of
obtaining land titles, we would expect to see fewer titles in areas where there are
other means of establishing ownership. Indeed, in rural villages, where rice paddy
production is the primary source of income, the probability of being titled is 18%,
contrasted with 48%, in villages where it is not. In our sample, only 3 urban villages
have rice paddies as their primary source of income and these villages have 59% titled
(as opposed to 66% for urban villages without rice paddy production as the primary
source), suggesting that the instrument may work better in rural areas. Not surpris-
ingly, given that you need to have a land title to be able to oer it as security, in
villages with rice paddies as the primary income source, 19% of formal bank loans
are securitized by land titles compared to 30% in the other villages.
Since the extent of rice paddy cultivation depends on geographical and climate
characteristics, we argue that the rice paddy variable should not be correlated with
the error term after we include dummy variables indicating in which subdistrict a
household is located. Both of our instruments might be subject to the criticism that
it is a measure of the overall development level of the village. To attempt to mitigate
this problem, we always include the mean income level in the village and the village's
population density in all specications where we are instrumenting.31
Using hypothetical demand, we can ask how our instruments are related to credit
demand. Looking at averages, hypothetical demand is signicantly dierent for areas
with and without rice paddy production as the primary source of income. When
we regress hypothetical demand on rice paddy and our controls, we see a negative
and signicant eect on credit demand. However, when we restrict the sample to
only those households (569 of 908) who have been judged feasible, the eect is no
29longer signicant at the 10% level.32 Hence, those with lower demand would likely
have been rejected anyway. Hypothetical demand and proximity to a forest are not
statistically signicantly related.33
After running the rst stage of 2SLS, we are able to check if our instruments do
explain possession of a formal land title after including other controls. For the binary
outcome of whether or not a household has had a formal bank loan, our instruments
always pass the test of joint signicance. When restricted to only rural subdistricts,
they pass the typical overidentication tests, suggesting that they do not inuence
credit access except via land title and we check for robustness as outlined above.
However, there is evidence that the instruments do not pass the overidentication
tests when run on the whole sample.
After instrumenting for the possession of title (in column (2) of table 14) with the
village-level instruments, we see that the eect of land title for rural subdistricts is
not statistically signicant. Column (3) shows the regression of having had a formal
bank loan on the residuals from the linear regression of being titled on the village-level
instruments and the controls. We see that the coecient on the variable of interest
is positive and signicant at the 10% level and of a greater magnitude, increasing the
probability of having had a formal bank loan by 9.2 points at the mean, than in the
naive results. We interpret this eect as a more direct measure of the signaling eect
since the residuals more closely track the meaning of being a signal for possession of
a formal land title.
Table 14 here
Our instruments do not work as well for formal loan amounts. Recall that less than
a third of the sample report formal loan amounts. The instruments pass the joint
signicance and the weak identication tests but fail to pass the overidentication
tests. The situation is worse when we restrict the sample to only rural subdistricts
(reducing the sample to 191 loan observations). In both samples, the coecient on
30being titled is positive but not statistically signicant. Constructing the residuals
as before, we see the coecient on the eect of interest is positive and statistically
signicant at the 10% level for the whole sample and positive but not statistically
signicant for the reduced sample. It is hard to interpret these results since it appears
that at least one of the instruments is not valid. When we drop rice paddy production
(in our minds, the most problematic of the two), the instrumented land title variable
is negative and still not signicant, as in the binary outcome, and the coecient on
the residuals is positive and signicant at the 1% level, shown in columns 5 and 6
of table 14.34 When we restrict the sample to rural subdistricts, a similar picture
emerges, except that the coecient on the residuals fails to obtain signicance at the
10% level (p-value of .129).
Alternatively, our instruments may introduce some bias. If being titled increases
credit demand, and areas with greater rice paddy production demand less formal
credit, then the IV estimates, including the residuals, will exacerbate the bias. The
same story could hold for being near a forest. However, working in our favor is the
fact that this criticism does not hold for the results on hypothetical supply, and these
results indicate that the naive estimates are biased downwards. In addition, there is
little evidence that demand is the driving force behind the relationship between land
titling and credit, possibly suggesting that even if some bias does exist, it is likely to
be small.
7 Conclusion
The approach of this paper has been to tell a story about how land titles might
aect an underdeveloped credit market. Our ndings join two familiar stories: the
Hernando de Soto story of collateral and the Muhammad Yunus story of micro-
nance. In the rst story, formal land titles are seen as unleashing the productivity of
31otherwise \dead" assets. It is a formal land title's ability to serve as collateral that
transforms xed assets into liquid ones and back again with ease. In the second story,
sophisticated bankers, without the aid of formal land titles, have already unleashed
these assets and more by making use of human and social capital.
In our paper, we show that formal land titles are important determinants of credit
access even when bankers regularly use micronance methods. Having a formal land
title increases a household's probability of having had a formal loan and also increases
the average loan size of those that do borrow. In general, the loan size is inuenced
by whether the title is oered as collateral. However, when looking at rst-time
borrowers, we see that the crucial component is merely possessing a land title and
actually oering the title as collateral does not signicantly increase the average
loan size. We argue that these results show that both collateral and signaling play
important roles in determining credit access.
This description of the credit market and land titling in Indonesia draws attention
to the interaction between contracting and property institutions. In the story that
we propose, bankers combine and use a variety of personal and impersonal methods
in response to the lack of information and diculty in enforcement in case of default.
Banking practices and the ability of households to contract should be an important
part of the economic analysis of the eect of land titles on access to credit. By incor-
porating local banking practices, our results help explain some more recent ndings,
such as Galiani and Schargrodsky [2010], that newly entitled households, as a result
of a titling program, do not have better access to credit. Our evidence suggests that
sporadically obtained formal land titles have an important informational component
that would be missing in systematically distributed land titles.35 Thus, these house-
holds may nd it dicult to access new credit when their land titles have little to no
informative content about household characteristics. Consequently, the approach of
assigning formal land titles in order to open up credit markets to new borrowers may
32not be as successful as policymakers might hope.
Of course, systematic titling programs may lead to changes in banking practices.
BRI and other banks in Indonesia are in favor of titling programs, suggesting that
there are important dynamic eects that should be considered. Additionally, per-
sonal characteristics might be signaled through alternative means, besides land titles,
following a large-scale titling program. However, the emphasis on the importance of
improving ex-ante information ows still remains.
Notes
1: Even if the land title has been inherited, possession of it improves incentives
to learn how to interact in the formal sector.
2: There are of course reasons why land title may provide a good form of col-
lateral. See de Soto [2000]. However, these reasons typically rely on assumptions of
a well-functioning legal infrastructure as well as fairly active land markets or assume
that these will develop along with widespread use of land titles. In this paper, we
will by necessity focus on partial or local short term eects.
3: The other 60% is made up of mainly salary guarantees but also other land
informal documents or vehicle ownership or even no security at all. For rst-time
borrowers with title, 42% oer it as collateral.
4: See Morduch [1999] for a thorough review of these methods.
5: As an example of an ex-ante informational eect, Bester [1985] shows that
banks can screen for types with low repayment costs by oering loan contracts with
higher collateral requirements at a lower interest rate.
6: Kochar [1997] argues that the existence of informal credit markets may cause
the empirical data to misrepresent the extent of credit rationing; institutional credit
may be accessed less because individuals' demand for credit may be satised by the
33informal sector.
7: On a relative scale, institutions that focus on micro-lending were aected less
drastically by the 1997 crisis. In fact BRI Units were protable throughout the crisis
and it is reported that the Units subsidized the Branch banks during and after the
crisis (Johnston et al. [2001]).
8: BRI has been extensively studied in the micronance literature. For more
information on the history and practices of BRI, see Maurer [1999].
9: To illustrate this point, consider the following method that is often used: the
loan applicant lls out a description of the condition of his/her assets, then the bank
sends a bank employee to view the assets in order to make a comparison. What the
bank cares about is not just the value of assets but also whether the description of
the assets was honest.
10: This number seems large, leading us to believe that managers have included
threats to foreclose. Formal foreclosure is a rare event in the small-scale loan market
in Indonesia. However, just because foreclosure is not observed is not an argument
that collateral is not at work. A simple game-theoretic framework yields a Nash
equilibrium where no one defaults yet the possibility of foreclosure is real. In the
Indonesian context, a threat to foreclose is unlikely to be supported by beliefs that
losing ones land in case of default is a real possibility. The Indonesian legal system
is a complex mix of Dutch, Muslim and customary (adat) law. Although the written
law should apply across provinces, the interaction between the three traditions of
law provides ample discretion for judges. With respect to foreclosure law, borrowers
rather than lenders are generally favored. Foreclosure is a socially sensitive issue, and
the legal practice of foreclosure in Indonesia is unpredictable and lengthy.
11: This is similar to what our empirical results show - having a formal land title
makes a household more likely to receive a formal loan. Conditional on receiving a
loan, having a land title has less inuence on the size of the loan.
3412: Land which has been designated as forest (roughly 60%) is handled by a
separate Ministry of Forest.
13: World Bank Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 28178-IND (2004).
14: The current system of titling should be understood in the context of how
land rights have been established previously, especially in areas where adat law is
still respected. Evidence of ownership can come in a variety of forms. The most
formal of these informal rights to land is a land deed or akte.It is a document that
represents the purchase of a piece of land and is ocially stamped and notarized.
A less formal but perhaps locally stronger right is the girik or petok which is a use
claim on land that comes from the customary law. Documents known as Letter C
or D are guaranteed by the village leader and can be inherited. In the MASS survey
land parcels with formal land titles are slightly overrepresented (45% of land parcels
have formal land titles, 12% have akte, 21% have either a girik, petok or letter C or
D, and nally 10% have only tax receipts to demonstrate ownership of that parcel).
Very few households in our sample, only 4% of landowners, have no documents at all.
15: Potensi Desa Statistik or Village Potential Statistics which were actually
collected in 2002.
16: Except for West Java where all households sampled were rural.
17: Alternatively we could instead use the the fraction of value of the household's
total land assets that is titled. In practice this distinction is almost irrelevant in our
data set because even though 352 of our households do report having more than one
land or garden plot, all but 57 of these households have either all their plots titled or
all untitled.
18: Of the remaining loans 14% are microbank loans and 12% are from other
informal sources. The average non-formal loan amount is CPI-adjusted US$203 .
19: Among informal loans, 33% are used for production and 67% for consump-
tion.
3520: All continuous variables were tested with both the conventional t-test (al-
lowing for the variances between the samples to dier) and with the non-parametric
Wilcoxon rank sum test. A test of proportionality was used with all binary variables.
There were no signicant dierences at the 10% level.
21: When the outcome of interest is hypothetical we choose to employ subdistrict
xed eects since the the unit manager does not have control over these outcomes.
22: Including geographical dummies at the subdistrict level instead of clustering
increases the precision with which we are able to measure the eect of title, improving
statistical signicance. The linear probability model gives similar results.
23: Over half of all formal loans do not use any type of land document. Instead
the most commonly cited security is an advance against future salaries such as xed
income or use of a guarantor.
24: By reputation-based contracting, we mean contracts that make use of rela-
tional enforcement mechanisms. For example, if a borrower defaults, on top of (or
instead of) losing the collateral, one loses the opportunity to borrow from the lender
and/or other lenders, relational enforcement is present.
25: Alternatively, repeat borrowers may need less public disclosure to enforce
their contracts (repeated interaction). In this case, there would be a weaker eect of
land title as security for repeat borrowers, which is inconsistent with our results.
26: Only 5% of formal loans are unsecuritized compared to 56% of micronance
loans and 64% of informal loans.
27: The drop in observations is primarily due to missing information although
the few outliers do have considerable impact.
28: We may also use predicted demand to partially identify supply using equation
3 and 4.
29: Our instruments are discussed in section 6. The main objection to our in-
struments that they should be correlated with credit demand does not apply to hy-
36pothetical supply. The instruments did not perform well for feasible loan amounts
(perhaps because feasible loan amounts are maximal loan size and the variation is
small).
30: Reverse causality is also another possible explanation; borrowing households
may use the loan to fund obtaining a land title. Our results do not signicantly
change when we restrict attention to recent loans, and since the titling process is
lengthy and there are numerous benets to having a land title, having obtained a
loan is not likely the dominant force behind deciding whether or not to obtain a land
title.
31: In our full specication we also include the mean number of years that land
assets are held in the village (to control for the degree of activity in the land markets).
32: Results not shown.
33: We next check for the weakness of our instruments since their presence may
lead to non-normal sample distributions and potentially large bias in the IV esti-
mates. Bound et al. [1995] show that this bias is not a small sample problem and
that it is possible for OLS estimates to be more reliable in large enough samples.
Several approaches have been proposed to assess the weakness of the instruments.
The approach we take is the following. For linear models, we rst make use of the
forward and reverse-2SLS test for weak instruments outlined in Hausman and Hahn
[2002]. If the forward and reverse estimates of the coecient on the endogenous vari-
able, land title, are relatively close we can have condence in the more commonly
used F-test on the joint signicance of our instruments. Accordingly, if the rst stage
F statistic from the rst stage of 2SLS is too small (below 10 is a commonly used cut
o, as suggested by Stock et al. [2002]), we do inference following Moreira and Poi
[2001] and use the Anderson-Rubin statistic to construct the proper critical value for
testing the coecient on titled since this test is robust to weak instruments. If the
rst stage F-statistic is large enough, we do the standard hypothesis testing of the
37coecient on titled and use the standard over-identication tests of exogeneity. In
practice we report both in the following sections. Since there is much less consensus
concerning the weak instrument problem in the non-linear case, we make use of the
log-likelihood ratio to determine whether the unrestricted bivariate probit model is
more appropriate than restricting the model to have zero correlation between the two
error terms. Our interpretation of both the sign and magnitude of the correlation will
reect the observation that weak instruments may articially inate the correlation
between the two error terms.
34: We favor the forested variable because it is less likely to indicate dierences
in economic opportunities than the rice paddy variable. Forested area is an ocial
designation and does not mean that actual forests are nearby. Since the ocial
designation prevents any land titles to be issued. Although there are regulations on
use of forested land, it is not clear how enforceable they are. Thus, it is likely that
many economic opportunities exist on ocially designated forested land.
35: On a more positive note, this argument could suggest that even rights of ex-
clusion to land that are not transferable might positively inuence credit access if the
process to receive these documents is not automatic. These types of rights are often
granted instead of fully transferable land rights when governments are worried that
the formalization of property rights will make it more likely for small-scale farmers
to lose their land. This practice has been used in India.
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41Table 1: Previous Literature
Study Region Pos. Signif. Ef-
fect?
Program












Rural India No Sporadic
Lopez [1996] Honduras Yes Systematic
Field and Torero
[2004]
Urban Peru Yes, for public bank
loans. No, for private





















Argentina Yes, but modest Systematic
Do and Iyer [2008] Vietnam No Systematic








Uganda No for title but Yes
for freehold tenure
Sporadic
42Table 2: Percentage Titled by Province
Province %Titled N
West Java .204 230
East Java .510 204
West Kalimantan .634 232
East Kalimantan .391 220
North Sulawesi .500 220
Papua .603 204
Total .471 1310
Source: BRI MASS 2002
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Panel A: BRI MASS 2002
Variable Mean Std Min Max N
FormalBank 0.29 0.45 0 1 1310
Total Assets (approx.US$) 5920 10800 2.5 157000 1310
Income per cap/poverty line 3.31 4.74 0.01 69.8 1308
Has salary 0.41 0.49 0 1 1310
Household head's education 7.99 3.94 0 16 1310
Household size 4.44 1.73 1 13 1310
HH's age 46.3 11.9 20 87 1309
Years in village 27.8 16.1 1 99 1303
Distance to bank (km) 6.78 9.91 0 56 1297
Mean income/povline in village 3.33 2.14 0.41 13.3 74
Mean years land is held in village 17.2 6.13 3 40 74
Rural 0.58 0.50 0 1 74
Panel B: PODES 2003
Population density (adultpop/hectare) 29.7 53.1 0.06 270 74
Population Census 0.68 0.49 0 1 74
Forest .24 .43 0 1 72
RicePaddy 0.39 0.49 0 1 74
Village has bank 0.23 0.42 0 1 74
43Table 4: Average Formal Loan Amounts in U.S. Dollars (CPI-adjusted) by Security
Panel A: All formal loan amounts (U.S.$)
Security Used Loan Amount Std Min Max N %
Land title 650 767 3 6606 100 25%
Fixed Income 527 462 6 3979 194 48%
Other land documents 347 238 12 1239 67 17%
Other security 560 821 12 2738 19 5%
No security 257 259 31 1010 22 5%
Total 515 551 3 6606 402
Panel B: First time loan amounts (U.S.$)
Security Used Loan Amount Std Min Max N %
Land title 742 600 109 2610 23 23%
Fixed Income 486 408 113 2586 44 44%
Other land documents 286 163 51 625 13 13%
Other security 253 188 42 512 7 7%
No security 230 221 31 721 12 12%
Total 472 444 31 2610 99
Source: BRI MASS 2002
44Table 5: Summary Statistics
Panel A: All Households that have a formal bank loan
Variable Mean Std Min Max N
Has Land Title 0.66 0.47 0 1 376
Total Assets (approx.US) 8982 12871 2.50 138000 376
Family Income per cap/PovLine 4.67 4.67 0.14 34.8 381
Has salary 0.57 0.50 0 1 381
Household head's education 9.56 3.82 0 16 381
Distance to Bank (km) 4.5 8.32 0 55 377
Mean Income/PovLine 4.37 2.68 1.11 13.3 381
Population Density 37.5 52.6 0.11 217 381
RicePaddy 0.27 0.45 0 1 381
Forest .23 .42 0 1 381
Population Census 0.73 0.45 0 1 381
Village has Bank 0.28 0.45 0 1 381
Panel B: Households that are rst time borrowers
Has Land Title 0.66 0.48 0 1 102
Total Assets (approx.US) 8887 16655 45 138000 102
Family Income per cap/PovLine 4.44 4.51 0.14 34.8 104
Has salary 0.54 0.50 0 1 104
Household head's education 9.76 3.79 3 16 104
Distance to Bank (km) 5.54 9.80 0.05 45 103
Mean Income/PovLine 4.75 3.17 1.11 13.3 104
Population Density 31.1 46.6 0.13 217 104
RicePaddy 0.22 0.42 0 1 104
Forest .25 .44 0 1 104
Population Census 0.70 0.46 0 1 104
Village has Bank 0.33 0.47 0 1 104
45Table 6: Marginal Eects Probit
(1) (2) (3)
Titled .073 .057 .048
(.043) (.039) (.036)
Log total xed asset value .077 .068 .066
(.020) (.022) (.021)
Income per cap/poverty line .003 .003 -.002
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Has salary .135 .110 .120
(.042) (.041) (.041)
Log distance to bank -.107 -.096 .018
(.052) (.052) (.037)
Village has bank .027 .022 .034
(.038) (.038) (.045)
years of schooling < 9 .023 .136
(.037) (.072)
9 < years of schooling < 12 .037 .0004
(.046) (.007)
years of schooling > 12 .132 .002
(.074) (.001)
Household size .0000478 -.001
(.007) (.0008)
HH head age .002 .028
(.001) (.008)
Years in village -.001 -.0006
(.0008) (.0004)




Mean yrs land is held in village .034
(.041)
Obs. 1295 1287 1287
e(ll) -668.397 -656.897 -637.478
e(r2-p) .139 .15 .175
This table presents a probit model with an indicator of having had a formal bank loan as the
outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level. Missing observations are
due to distance to nearest bank variable. Marginal eects are reported at the median. Column
1 uses only income and asset variables as controls. Column 2 adds household characteristics and
column 3 adds village level characteristics as controls.
46Table 7: Loan Size - OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Titled .243 .148 .034
(.123) (.118) (.126)






First-timer w/ titled collateral .034
(.307)
Log total xed asset value .072 .080 .072 .069
(.036) (.034) (.035) (.035)
Income per cap/poverty line .050 .048 .048 .047
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Has salary -.062 .018 -.006 .002
(.138) (.163) (.158) (.149)
Mean income/povline in village .016 .019 .018 .019
(.025) (.028) (.027) (.024)
Population density .0009 .001 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Mean yrs land is held in village .005 .003 .004 .004
(.011) (.011) (.011) (.011)
years of schooling < 9 -.011 .017 -.002 .019
(.195) (.190) (.194) (.197)
9 < years of schooling < 12 .272 .335 .306 .324
(.148) (.135) (.139) (.131)
years of schooling > 12 .302 .400 .359 .378
(.197) (.184) (.184) (.182)
Household size .049 .046 .047 .045
(.032) (.033) (.033) (.034)
HH head age -.007 -.004 -.006 -.006
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Years in village -.006 -.007 -.007 -.006
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Obs. 365 362 362 362
e(r2-a) .149 .151 .152 .154
This table presents an OLS model with log of formal bank loan amounts (in dollars) as the outcome
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level. All columns use the same controls
(with the exception of the variables of interest).
47Table 8: Salaried Households and Collateral Choice
All Observations for Salaried Households with Formal Loans
Households with land titles and salary
Type Loan Assets Educ Feasible Current Payback N
Oered Salary 6.04 17.89 12.05 .93 .98 1.28 119
Oered Land 5.66 17.63 9.03 .83 .93 189.12 30
Households with other land documents and salary
Oered Salary 6.00 16.73 10.66 .93 .97 .68 73
Oered Land 5.92 17.84 9.24 1 .76 1.45 17
Note: Loan, Current, and Payback have fewer observations than N
Excluding Outliers and Observations with Missing Information
Households with land titles and salary
Type Loan Assets Educ Feasible Current Payback N
Oered Salary 6.08 17.99 12.55 .94 .98 .65 82
Oered Land 5.88 17.83 9.80 .89 1 .63 20
Households with other land documents and salary
Oered Salary 6.01 16.72 10.57 .96 .98 .68 45
Oered Land 5.94 17.83 7.73 1 .82 1.45 12
Bold indicates signicantly dierent at 5% level
Source: BRI MASS 2002 data set
48Table 9: Salaried Households and Collateral Choice: Robustness Check
Dependent Variable=Oered Salary as Collateral
Households with land titles and salary
Collateral Ranking 1 2 3 4
Salary Relatively Better 1.034 .976
[.247] [.302]
Predicted Salary Relatively Better .360 .359
[.235] [.286]
Controls No Yes No Yes
Log-likelihood -68.25 -55.80 -76.17 -60.31
N 132 132 132 132
Households with other land documents and salary
Salary Relatively Better -.179 -.062
[.295] [.339]
Predicted Salary Relatively Better -.529 -.534
[.294] [.358]
Controls No Yes No Yes
Log-likelihood -56.62 -46.31 -55.17 -45.19
N 83 83 83 83
Source: BRI MASS 2002 data set
Notes: The results are from a Probit model with an indicator for choosing to oer a xed income as collateral as the outcome
variable. The variable of interest is an indicator for whether or not the household's xed income is relatively larger than the value of
the household's land assets. Relative value refers to which, the salary or land assets, belong to the highest decile. Predicted relative
value uses a full set of controls (except for total assets and income) and subdistrict xed eects. The control variables are the full set
of controls except for household's total assets and income.
Table 10: Households who applied for a loan
Status Desired Loan Assets Income Educ Titled
Rejected 5.38 17.22 3.20 7.63 .58
Accepted 5.96 17.76 4.87 9.71 .64
Bold indicates signicantly dierent at 5% level
Notes: Desired Loan is in logs of CPI-adjusted US$ with loan amounts for Accepted either as
loan amount applied for or actual loan amount. Assets in logs of Rupiah. Income relative to the
poverty line. Education is years of schooling.
Source: BRI MASS 2002 data set




Land title security -.198 -.254
(.232) (.229)
Working capital loan -.302 -.415 -.373
(.226) (.221) (.230)
Titled w/ WC loan .466 .011 -.098
(.254) (.289) (.304)
WC loan w/ titled collateral .853 .914
(.278) (.272)
Log total xed asset value .076 .076 .070
(.037) (.036) (.036)
Income per cap/poverty line .049 .051 .051
(.008) (.009) (.009)
Has salary -.069 -.081 -.092
(.182) (.188) (.185)
Mean income/povline in village .016 .013 .012
(.027) (.027) (.026)
Population density .0009 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001)
Mean yrs land is held in village .005 .002 .004
(.011) (.011) (.011)
years of schooling < 9 -.052 -.028 -.033
(.192) (.182) (.185)
9 < years of schooling < 12 .257 .262 .246
(.145) (.136) (.137)
years of schooling > 12 .307 .323 .298
(.187) (.177) (.176)
Household size .049 .062 .064
(.031) (.035) (.035)
HH head age -.007 -.008 -.009
(.005) (.005) (.005)
Years in village -.006 -.006 -.005
(.003) (.003) (.003)
Obs. 365 362 362
e(r2-a) .157 .171 .171
This table presents an OLS model with log of formal bank loan amounts (in dollars) as the outcome
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level. All columns use the same controls
(with the exception of the variables of interest).
50Table 12: Demand Derived from Rejected Applicants
OLS Heckman Heckman
(1) (2) (3)
Titled -.268 -.197 -.202
(.385) (.571) (.455)
Log total xed asset value .465 .420 .555
(.187) (.800) (.566)
Income per cap/poverty line .125 .151 .137
(.070) (.123) (.094)
Has salary -.367 -.356 -.125
(.367) (1.605) (1.128)
Mean income/povline in village -.175 -.063 -.122
(.094) (.357) (.254)
Population density .003 .009 .009
(.004) (.010) (.008)
Mean yrs land is held in village -.075 .072 .044
(.045) (.261) (.188)
years of schooling < 9 1.083 1.261 1.103
(.599) (1.887) (1.410)
9 < years of schooling < 12 .556 .610 .447
(.394) (1.131) (.804)
years of schooling > 12 2.073
(1.080)
Household size .116 .023 .079
(.099) (.505) (.364)
HH head age -.010 -.091 -.093
(.019) (.041) (.031)




Obs. 68 383 383
e(r2-a) .247
e(lambda) -2.606 -1.888
Column 1 of this table presents an OLS model with log of formal bank loan application amounts (in
dollars) as the outcome variable for only those applicants who were rejected. Columns 2 and 3 use a
Heckman selection model using distance to the nearest bank as the selection variable. Column 3 adds
as a control the residuals from a regression of hypothetical supply loan amounts on all the controls
(including titled). Robust standard errors are reported and all columns use the same controls.
51Table 13: Hypothetical Supply and Demand
Hypothetical Supply Hypothetical Demand
Dep. Var.=Feasible Dep. Var.=Desired Loan Amt
OLS IV OLS OLS Heckman
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Titled .178 .544 -.067 -.0006 -.113
(.121) (.279) (.086) (.140) (.146)
Feasible .523 .070
(.096) (.120)
Titled and feasible -.114 -.066
(.149) (.169)
Log total xed asset value .388 .307 .408 .338 .246
(.050) (.063) (.047) (.045) (.047)
Income per cap/poverty line .098 .101 .041 .038 .049
(.022) (.024) (.009) (.009) (.010)
Has salary -.470 -.645 -.215 -.158 -.598
(.107) (.092) (.080) (.078) (.098)
years of schooling < 9 .154 .027 .291 .260 .375
(.123) (.109) (.090) (.090) (.102)
9 < years of schooling < 12 .363 .267 .263 .222 .354
(.125) (.123) (.091) (.091) (.109)
years of schooling > 12 .761 .597 .539 .454 .433
(.213) (.221) (.154) (.154) (.205)
Household size .014 .011 .048 .048 .124
(.027) (.025) (.021) (.020) (.025)
HH head age .001 -.003 -.005 -.006 -.009
(.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Years in village -.006 -.003 -.004 -.003 -.0009
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Mean income/povline .034 .019 -.0008 -.010 .011
in village (.035) (.025) (.031) (.032) (.028)
Population density -.003 -.002 -.002 -.001 .0008
(.002) (.001) (.0009) (.0009) (.0008)
Mean yrs land is held .005 .003 .019 .018 -.026
in village (.015) (.009) (.011) (.011) (.008)
Obs. 1241 1280 907 897 1135
e(ll) -588.246 -1301.084 -1180.47 -1147.844 -1646.689
e(r2-p) .263
This table presents a probit model with an indicator of being judged a feasible borrower as the
outcome variable in the rst and second columns. The second column uses household head's age, a
village indicator of rice production and a village indicator of forested area as instruments for being
titled. The rst column is run with xed eects at the subdistrict level and both report robust
standard errors. The third and fourth columns are OLS models with log of desired loan amounts (in
dollars) as the outcome variable. The fourth column adds as a control whether or not the household
was judged feasible to borrow. Full set of controls are used in all columns.
52Table 14: Village-level Endogeneity
Dependent Variable
T FB FB T FLA FLA
OLS Biprobit OLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Village IV Titled -.124 -.094
(.334) (.673)






F-stat for IV 14.39 3.89
Joint sign. of Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls at 1% level
Obs. 777 777 777 365 365 365
R2 .289 .235 .283 .158 .18
e(ll) -366.4 -689.0 -345.2 -198.0 -483.5 -478.8
e(rho) .253
In this table, the dependent variables are T standing for titled, FB for formalbank and FLA for
formal loan amounts in logs of CPI-adjusted US dollars. This table presents three dierent IV
models. The rst is a biprobit model with an indicator of having had a formal bank loan and
possessing a land title as the outcome variables, shown in column 2. The second model uses the
residuals from predicting possession of a formal land title using village-level instrumental variables
as the variable of interest, shown in column 3. These results for these models are only presented for
the restricted sample containing rural villages. The full set of controls are used. Column 1 presents
the \rst-stage" for both of these models. Column 5 presents the 2SLS estimates for formal loan
amounts, the third IV model and column 6 presents the fourth model, analogous to the second
model. All formal loans are used. Distance to nearest bank and village bank controls have been
excluded, but otherwise a full set of controls is included. Column 4 presents the \rst-stage" for
both of these models. Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level. Marginal eects are not
reported for the Biprobit model.
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